Russian - Kazakhstan Relations in Context

of OSCE Membership

 

K. Chatybekova, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Almaty

 

 

OSCE is a unique organization. Its strength is lying in a fact that it is the only pan-European organization where Russia and other Post-Soviet states freely communicate with US and EU countries. It is worth recalling the debates which led to the foundation of the OSCE (then CSCE) in 1975. The Soviet Union placed great emphasis on inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, while the West put its faith in the human dimension. Dissidents all over Europe, especially behind the Iron Curtain, drew strength from the Helsinki principles setting out the importance of democracy and human rights.  

 

         Russia and OSCE

 

         When the Soviet Union collapsed the OSCE enjoyed a new lease of life, sending missions to help resolve ethnic and minority issues in several European states. But Putin’s Russia never warmed to the human dimension of OSCE and since the early years of 2000-s Moscow has sought to ignore or even undermine the organization.

         The OSCE is important for EU for several reasons: it codifies some of fundamental principles on which the EU organization is based (democracy, rule of law, human rights); it provides a unique platform for pan – European discussions concerning the problems of European security; and it can offer expertise on areas of major interests to EU, alongside with those regions as Balkans, Caucasus or Central Asia.

         The EU does seem to have regained the initiative as the venue for discussion of President Medvedev for a new European security treaty.

         Russian policy towards OSCE is full of ambiguity. Historically, Russia is a champion of the idea of pan-European security cooperation based on inclusive and equal participation by all states. The first glimmer of what later became the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was evoked in the Soviet call in 1954 for the all-European conference. In a different shape, the idea was mooted again by the Warsaw Pact in 1969. This proposal led eventually to the negotiations on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act where the Soviet diplomacy played a leading role. Fifteen years later, “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy helped to create the context for agreement on the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Signed by all CSCE participating states, the Charter set a framework of shared values and common purpose across a wider Europe that lasted well into the 1990-s. After the end of the Cold War, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remained a core theme of Russian Federation foreign policy. In contrast to other more restrictive clubs in Europe, Moscow saw real benefits in the OSCE as a venue for inclusive pan - European security organization.

         Ever since the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed by the heads of state and governments of the nations in Europe and North America, Russia (still the Soviet Union) had been considered to be the champion of the OSCE. This subsequently became the OSCE, - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995.

         Moscow only championed the CSCE/OSCE as long as it retained the strong belief that ownership of the Conference and the Organization alike. While Moscow believed that it got the value it paid for from the Organization, or believed it could achieve that value. This was true throughout the mid-1990s, or, even, through to the end of 1990s, when the last summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the participating states of the OSCE was held in Istanbul in 1999 in order to endorse the Charter for European Security.

         The moment that the feeling of value evaporated, the Russian Federation started to progressively lose ownership of the OSCE. This change resulted in mounting criticism of the organization by Moscow and its allies – the member state of the Collective security Treaty Organization (SCTO). The criticism focused on the “imbalances’ in the deployment of field missions and other activities of the OSCE, which were concentrated “East of Vienna” (South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and in the human dimension – at the expence of security (hard or soft), as well as economic and ecological issues which, allegedly, were increasingly neglected by OSCE.

         Once Moscow lost the feeling that it was getting the value it was paying for by supporting the OSCE, why would it continue to pursue its own agenda, particularly in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, not to speak of Russian Federation itself?

         The 2008 initiative of the Russian president Medvedev called for a meeting of the European heads mainly participating in the OSCE, - to launch a process which was supposed to lead to a Treaty of European Security covering the whole OSCE area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This initiative has resulted in an intensified European Security Dialogue, with the OSCE acting an important part platform.

         The initiative also raised expectations that, whatever the outcome of the current security dialogue, Russia might regain the ownership of a single pan-European organization with a mandate to address a wide range of issues from security to human rights and the rule of law.

         The challenge with which the Russian Federation finds itself confronted is twofold. Firstly, Moscow remains a status quo power seeking to resist further political and geopolitical changes in its immediate neighborhood [1]. It remains concerned first and foremost with the open doors policy pursued by NATO with regard to the Soviet successor states, Ukraine and Georgia in particular, despite the fact that the eastward enlargement of the Alliance has been put on hold with the advent of the Obama administration in Washington.

         Preserving the status quo is likely to remain even bigger issues on Russia’s agenda against the background of continuous erosion and fragmentation of the “post Soviet space”, as many newly independent states are increasingly tempted not merely NATO membership but rather, by the offer of the European Union’s Eastern partnership. At the same time Russia appears increasingly unable to attract its neighbors with its own integration proposals.

         In many situations the OSCE and Russia share different positions. Although it is an OSCE member-state, Russia does not always follow the general policy of the OSCE in the country. Thus, the OSCE and Russia differ in their assessment of the nature of the ruling system of government. While the OSCE is putting its efforts in stimulating democratic transformation in the country, Russia has opposed any attempt to criticize the current political regime. The Transdnestrian conflict is a stumbling block for OSCE and Russia differences in their attitudes towards Moldova. The future of democratic development of Ukraine became a dividing line in OSCE – Russian relations in this state. The future of the OSCE in the countries of the region depends to a large degree on internal political and economic transformation. The OSCE has more chance for success in a country which is moving towards democratic development. Any positive democratic development in that country positively impacts its relationships with the OSCE and its effectiveness in that country. The OSCE has less chance for success in a country which is moving away from the democratic development. The potential for a future democratic development is a decisive element for OSCE prospects in the region.

 

         Kazakhstan chairmanship in OSCE

 

         Year 2010 is marked by a special attention of the whole Trans-Atlantic and Trans -Eurasian sphere towards Asia and activities of Kazakhstan republic, chairing OSCE in the current year. While many questioned the role and position of OSCE in the international arena and its deeds, the rest were seriously engaged in preparation to host first Summit of this great regional block in the 21st century.

         Adopting the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 which established 10 principles guiding relations among sovereign states, Conference on Security and Cooperation took its lead towards peaceful settlement and resolution of occurring and postponed conflicts, left the Cold War, Soviet Union dissolution and new challenges of post-bilateral era, finally stopping at the time when it was felt that Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (took the status after Budapest Summit of 1994) is consistently finds itself outdated towards the expectations of 21st century and conditions which are present in a new multipolar world [2].

 

         Astana Summit 

         Astana Summit intended to break barriers that were limiting OSCE as an organization in its actions and to breathe new life into regional cooperation in terms of all 3 dimensions of OSCE. For that reason Kazakhstan initially put 9 main discussion points into the agenda of Summit:

1)     Formation of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community

2)     Reaffirmation of member-states towards all norms and principles of OSCE in military, economic and human dimensions

3)     High attention to counterbalancing transnational challenges, since nowadays concept of “European security” reaches far beyond the European continent and includes Asian component

4)     Strengthening arms control and scrutinizing trust measures and security by updating Vienna document of 1999

5)     Mediation and peace settlement in the zones of so-called “frozen” and “postponed” conflicts

6)     Strengthening institutional foundation of OSCE which will be a framework to transform regional organization to international level

7)     Problems of Afghanistan

8)     Maastricht Strategy of OSCE and further development in negotiations to strengthen economic-financial part of cooperation among member-states

9)     Development of Human Dimension of OSCE by actions to counter challenges in tolerance – building, nondiscrimination, Mass media freedom, and maintenance of all basic freedoms of human being.

 

Overall the matters which were put on the agenda and were planned to be discussed presented and ambitious plan of Kazakhstan to awake organization in this new world, facing new challenges and problems. OSCE Summit was not held for 11 years, and some analysts predicted that it would not have been held for the next 40-50 years [3]. World leaders representing 56 member-states, 12 observing states and different regional organizations gathered from November 2 to shape the new vision of OSCE organization in 21st century.

 

Conclusion

The list of participating leaders was outstanding, including major figures in present world politics and secretary generals of such organizations as UN. During this Summit 27 leaders of member-states, 1 vice-president, 10 prime-ministers, 1 state secretary, 6 vice-prime-ministers, 8 ministers of foreign affairs and 2 ambassadors. Among the Summit participants also were representatives of OSCE partner-states.

After welcoming speeches done by OSCE officials Marc Perrin de Brichambeaut, Kanat Saudabayev, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and host country president Nursultan Nazarbayev OSCE 7th Summit has started. What was initially decided covered the sphere of the most complicated question divided different countries. Kazakhstan did the best to fulfill the task.

 

 

Lobjakas, A. (2006) OSCE: Russian Key to New Presidency’s Attempts To Resolve Frozen Conflicts.

Lynch, D. (2009). The State of OSCE.

Neukirch, C. (2001). Russia and the OSCE – The Influence of Interested Third and Disintegrated Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova.