История / 2.Общая история

PhD Dadabaeva G.R.

Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research,

Almaty, Kazakhstan

The issues of nationalism in Kazakhstan language policy

Language policy is one of the most interesting problems of modern world, where ever we could observe the result of interconnection of state and society in this sphere. The growth of interest of social scientists to these issues after the demise of the Soviet Union just enhanced the field of application of different theoretical approaches and academic explanations of this phenomenon whether it’s an appeal to E. Gellner’s idea of homogenization of culture along with the state’s political borders (Gellner E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell), or construction of nation-state under the guidance of political elite, trying to reach a civic unification of it’s diverse, ethnically, linguistically and by other factors, population (C. Geerz, 1963). Some scholars have connected the sensitivity of these problems with the possibility for the representatives of different groups to get and, which is more important, to keep control over the economic and political spheres of influences (Horowitz D., 1985).

Widely accepted preposition that state in post-Soviet Kazakhstan during first decade of independence shifted from well established in society Russian lingua franca to “less developed” Kazakh language at the same time left some “blank space” for explaining comparatively successful process of it’s implementation in society.

The clusters of the problems to answer for these questions seem to be the following: why the state was in need to force the process of accepting of Kazakh language as a “state” one? And, in connection with previous question, if the state was in need to make it, could we say that state was strong enough or weak to provide this process?

The beginning of Kazakhstan as a state:

The demise of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1990-s was clearly marked with the two opposite to each other processes:

1) growth of nationalistic aspirations, especially in Baltic and Slavic republics, partly covered the territories of Central Asian republics, including Kazakhstan. The events of December 1986 defined by Central Committee of CPSU as “Kazakh nationalism” were the striking signs of the beginning of new period in history of our state;

2) but suddenly when the USSR had collapsed Kazakhstan as other Central Asian republics expressed their unwillingness to leave the Union. Kazakhstan was the last republic declaring it independence after disintegration of the Soviet Union.

What the real reasons were laying under the surface of these contradictory processes in which Kazakhstan was involved?

The breakdown of economic system of former Soviet Union when in 1991Kazakhstan produced industrial production as in 1975 [1], meant for republic massive unemployment, closing of plants and factories, shortage of consumer goods and feelings of desperate in society. The main problem for the republic in this situation was the closing of industrial enterprises and massive unemployment among Russian population though it touched Kazakh people too. In these circumstances cultural entrepreneurs of Russian-speaking population were unable to suggest any new program to become the real leaders of political changes in republic.

In Kazakhstan appeared new political force – Kazakh nationalists convinced that indigenous population has to keep complete political control over the situation in republic. The period when D.A. Kunaev was the first secretary of Kazakh SSR Communist party (1964-86) became the beginning of the process of replacement of previous elite by Kazakhs, coincided with the growth of nationalism under political leadership patronage [2]. As the power of nation grew nationalism became the principal basis of political legitimacy and events in December 1986 just proved it when some people expressed their desire to see as a leader of republic, at least the Russian from Kazakhstan, apart from the claims for the Kazakh leadership. This fact means that people realized their interests as citizens of certain national territorial unit different from the interests of center.

But the same events showed the other things – the state became inseparable from the dominant national group and Kazakhs were thought to represent their own interests. So, the real force of political life at the beginning of 1990-s was state and it’s leadership. As the result of this complicated configuration the real power in Central Asian republics, including Kazakhstan, was concentrated in hands of Soviet leaders, who’s task after the demise of USSR was to take the power and keep it. In search of a new ideology the government gave preferences to state nationalism looking more appropriate to claim politics of sovereign, independent Kazakhstan.

In the meantime, M.S. Gorbachev’s reforms “created favorable conditions for mass political mobilization whose most potent base was ethnic rather than political [3]. The latter factors turned the focus of state interests to the demands of nationalists.

The interests of Kazakh nationalists and state political leadership at that time became closer opposite to Russian population who had no idea how the Russian nationalism would work in independent Kazakhstan. So, in early 1990-s, the whole Soviet ideology and doctrine, the intellectual bulwark of communism, evaporated with the collapse of the USSR. Only state remained [4].

The process of coming nearer views and ideas of state leadership and Kazakh nationalists happened mainly due to fear of territorial and border disputes, social disorder as consequence of economic crisis and natural desire of local political elite to keep the power. In these circumstances political leadership saw a strong state as the means to prevent all negative consequences of independence.

Kazakh language policy as a state policy

If we accept the idea that the state in Kazakhstan was “strong” enough [5] to achieve it’s own goals we could explain it in context of language policy.

The state program “On the Development of Kazakh language and other national languages in the Kazakh SSR in the Period Up to 2000 [6] was adopted when N. Nazarbaev began officially played major role in Kazakhstan politics.

A central issue for the discussions among scientists, politicians and people involved in politics became problems of ethnicity, exactly ethnic politics and status of Kazakh and Russian language in republic. Following R. Brubaker’s idea of “nationalizing nationalism” we could see how state used these aspiration feelings to support the claims of “core nation” defined in ethnocultural terms [7]. So, the problems of Kazakh ethnicity-to-be “titular nation” very quickly became the driving engine of nation-state building process.

These laws were accepted under growing pressure and participation of interested Kazakh- and Russian-speaking population in comparison with 1987 acts on language. The enthusiasm of Kazakh nationalism became the necessary component in a situation when government of Kazakhstan tried to get more space in the room for maneuver. Three years later was published a “Declaration of Sovereignty” where government seriously touched the problems of state language.

For its own political purposes government supported the idea that “core nation” is a legitimate “owner” of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. But despite having its own state, the core nation is conceived as being weak culturally and economically. The weak position is seen as a legacy of discrimination policy of Soviet power. The clear picture could be seen through the observation of ratio of Kazakhs and Russians in economic landscape.

By 1989 Kazakhs consisted of 39,7 % and Russians about 37,8 % of the population of Kazakhstan. Kazakhs occupied positions in government, administration and mainly preferred humanitarian professions. Majority of Russian population represented skilled labor and middle class living in urban areas. The troubles of economic crisis touched everyone but the bankruptcy of industrial sector only part of Kazakhstan’s population and mainly Russian speaking.

Even in the early 1990-s about 70% of all consumer goods to Kazakhstan was provided by Russia and some other republics. So, republican government made in 1989 an attempt to introduce a new import-substitution program in order to fill the local consumer market. Unfortunately, the program couldn’t overcome the skirmishes of Soviet Union economic system collapse. Anyway, republican political elite made a first step on the way to real “sovereignty” based on economic factors.

State Reforms and nationalizing language politics

Kazakhstan political reforms proceeded in a number of clearly delineated stages. During this period the country’s political leadership abandoned communist ideology and previous social, political and economic institutions, developed a version of independent, secular state based on market economic relations and recognizing, conventional principles of international law.

One of main obstacles on this way was the task to create in a short amount of time unified and distinctive nation and the easiest way was the using of the claims of Kazakh nationalists to fulfill this task. Political elite of Kazakhstan just sorted and collected from their claims those issues which were appropriate for the state tasks.

In 1989-90-s “State Program…” and “Law on Languages” were adopted in the atmosphere of expectations of quick changes in favor of titular nation. In order to press the republican supporters of close relations with Moscow the government encouraged the sharp discussions on Kazakh people troubles during Soviet period. The government defined in “Declaration of Independence” (1991) [8] the status of Kazakh language in a very limited scale along with “the rebirth and development of culture, traditions …of the Kazakh nation.” The last point became the most important for agreement between government and Kazakh nationalists. The Kazakh nationalists were unable at this time to overwhelm the government due of their “backwardness” in comparison to the nationalists of other post-Soviet republics and Third world countries. So, the state could use the most sensible for the majority of country population issues and along with this process to create its own ideology of state nationalism.

The first state Constitution adopted in 1993 expressed the state desire to keep under control the process of nation- and state building completely in “Soviet style”. Kazakh language was defined as a “state” language and Russian as a language of “interethnic communication”. “Republic of Kazakhstan – was defined - “as a state system self-determined by the Kazakh nation” relegating all non-Kazakh to an inferior position within the state. So, these ethnocultural issues became the driven factors in government reform that included dominance of ethnic Kazakhs in high level positions, particularly executive positions at the government ministerial level and at the level of oblast governors.

The state didn’t need Russian population in former capacity, so the nationalists regards coincided with the state goals. Wave of disappointment of Kazakh nationalists by still existed “official” status of Russian language provided a great assistance for government in order to oust from the territory of the republic Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups. Due to all these factors massive migration to neighboring Russia, then Germany began. But even in this case the political leadership was not in risk to share the major part of power with Kazakh nationalists. Ethno-nationals were unable to get power, and moreover, to concentrate it in their hands. Main benefits in this case were taken by political leaders who quickly replaced the “communist ideology” by new one – “state nationalism”. In constructing new political and cultural identity state successfully used some notions of Kazakh nationalists and some claims from the side of Russian-speakers who became a minority group, especially after parliamentary crisis of 1994-95. The crisis helped the government to form the framework of interethnic relations that had to accommodate both sides. Here, beginning with the period of real political reforms since 1996-1997 we could notice the slow transformation of Kazakh nationalists from “suffering group” of ethnic minority to a majority group of nation-builders.

References:

1. Akhmedgaliev, Bolat. 10 years: Kazakhstan and integration. Almaty: 2001, p. 28.

2. Шац Е., Дадабаева Г. К проблеме «трайбализма» в казахском обществе // Отан тарихы, 1998, № 3, с. 81-86.

3. Zaslavsky, Victor. The Soviet Union in “After Empire”. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, p. 84.

4. Gleason, Gregory. The Central Asian States. Discovering Independence. Westview Press, 1997, p. 16.

5. Jackman, Robert. Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation – State. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.

6. Государственная программа по улучшению изучения казахского языка // Казахстанская правда, 1990, 1 июля.

7. Brubaker, Roger. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 8.

8. О государственной независимости // Казахстанская правда, 1991, 16 декабря.