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Kishinets L.A., Bilan N.V.
Donetsk national university of economics
and trade named after
Mykhaylo Tugan- Baranovsky
The consequences of Ukrainian economic crisis
The impact of the global liquidity
crisis on Ukraine was even deeper than in most other emerging markets, as
indicated by the declines in output discussed above, the large 60% depreciation
of the Hryvnia against the US Dollar in 2008, and the drop in the PFTS stock
index of more than 74% in 2008 one of the largest declines in the world. The
latest period of economic growth was supported by two main factors: first, by
cyclically high commodity prices for exports; and second, by high domestic demand
fueled by expansionary monetary policies and by banking sector creditfinanced
primarily by foreign capital. Demand and consumption were encouraged. However,
supply-side policies were neglected. The crisis therefore resulted from a
downward correction of unsustainable growth of the real economy and the
financial sector. The weaknesses on the supply-side were due to the lack of
implementation of structural economic reforms needed to build the basis for
sustainable growth, support long-term productivity enhancements and improve the
country's international competitiveness. A financial crisis is the final
outcome of persistent macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, if these
imbalances are driven by a narrow set of factors linked to global economic
cycles, then the stability of the national economy becomes hostage to
developments in the global markets. Evidently, Ukraine was exposed to this
particular type of macroeconomic imbalance, which resulted from the global rise
in commodity prices and a period of ample liquidity in the global capital
markets.
For several years until the fall of
2008, Ukraine enjoyed strong economic performance supported by favorable global
conditions and robust domestic demand. Despite the fact that the global
financial crisis had been spreading through developed countries for almost a
year, the Ukrainian government believed that the country was immune to this
international crisis. Indeed, over the first nine months of 2008, Ukraine did
not see significant signs of weaknesses. The economy grew at a robust 6.3%,
inflation started to decline and public finances were in good shape as the
consolidated fiscal budget remained in surplus. Exports grew at a record high
rate of 50%, while net FDI inflows stood at $9 billion, fully covering the
nine-month current account gap. Finally, the gross
international reserves of the National Bank reached a peak of $37 billion at
the end of September 2008. However, the economy started to weaken in October
2008. A combination of global risk aversion and falling world commodity demand
and prices resulted in an 8% GDP contraction during the last quarter of 2008.
This reduced cumulative GDP growth from 6.3%
in the first three quarters of the year to just 2.1% by the end of 2008.
Industry, trade and construction, which consistently drove economic growth in
previous years, reported significant slowdowns, pushing down GDP growth.
The share of problem loans in bank
portfolios grew to 10.3 percent by December 11, 2008 and is continuing to grow.
Banks have all but stopped issuing loans, and clients have hurried to withdraw
deposits. In October 2008 the National Bank of Ukraine introduced a moratorium
on withdrawals ahead of schedule.Industrial output in November 2008 tumbled
28.6 percent, following a 19.8 decline in October 2008. In November 2008, the
IMF approved a stand-by loan program for Ukraine to the tune of $16.5 billion.
A second one worth $1.87 billion might be granted in February 2009.In November
2008, the official unemployment rate increased by 0.4 percent to 2.3
(Previously 1.9% in September), the State Statistics Committee said that as of
December 1 (2008), it registered 640,000 unemployed people.
Ukraine's banking system recorded
losses of 7 billion hryvnias (UAH) ($909 million) in the first quarter of 2009
compared to a profit of 2.1 billion hyrnvias in the same period a year ago,
according to a central bank report of April 22, 2009. On May 18, 2009 Ukraine's
State Statistics Committee reported that the deficit of Ukraine's foreign trade
in the first quarter of 2009 was estimated at $419.7 million, which was 9 times
down on the same period the previous year. On September 17, 2009 the World Bank
approved a loan for Ukraine in the amount of $400 million. According to a
public opinion poll conducted by FOM-Ukraine in September/October 2009 46.2% of
those polled thought that the economic situation in the country would worsen
within the next few months, while 35% stated that the economic situation in
Ukraine would remain unchanged and 8% thought the situation would improve. Late
November 2009 acting vice governor of the National Bank of Ukraine Vasyl
Pasichnyk forecasted no mass bankruptcies in the Ukrainian banking sector.
Ukraine's total foreign debt (state
and corporate) had reached 93.5% of the 912.563 billion Hryvnya GDP in March
2010; late February 2010 the Ukrainian Finance Ministry had reported that the
country's total state debt by early 2010 was to 32.9% of the GDP. Standard &
Poor's upgraded Ukraine's rating the same day. March 18, 2010 the National Bank
of Ukraine stated the total external debt in Ukraine increased 2.3% to $103.973
billion in 2009, and it considered a 4% GDP growth realistic for 2010 the same
day. The Ukrainian economy recovered in the first quarter of 2010 due to
stronger-than-expected growth in the global economy, driven primarily by
emerging Asia and Latin America, larger social transfers to the population
approved in the 2010 budget law and a lower price for imported natural gas (due
to the 2010 Ukrainian–Russian Naval Base for Natural Gas treaty).
The Ukrainian economy recovered in the
first quarter of 2010. Ukraine's real GDP growth in 2010 was 4.3%, leading to
per capita PPP GDP of 6,700 USD. The resumed growth has been helped by growth
in neighbouring Russia, which is by far the country's largest trading partner
and export market.