PhD. Fomin A
Moscow State University (Faculty of Philosophy)
The
Ways of Understanding of Time in Philosophical Hermeneutics
It was M. Heidegger who has at the first time posed such problem.
If earlier all criticism was amounted to
the criticism of
concepts, then since edition of "Being
and Time"
criticism becomes the criticism of conceptualizations, criticism of approaches and strategies. It was Heidegger who has at
first time demonstrated the power that has a vulgar concept of time throughout the history of philosophy from Aristotle to Bergson, and tried to overcome it. Symptomaticaly, that the project of overcoming of the vulgar concept of time took place in the framework of hermeneutic philosophy. Apparently, philosophical hermeneutics can pretend to the
role of the thematic space of
researching of different approaches of understanding of time. However, the priority of philosophical hermeneutics in solving the problem of time cannot be taken dogmatically. It should make sure, could the philosophical hermeneutic conceptualization of time be opposed to all the existing strategies of conceptualization of time? And for this, above all, we should focus on
distinctions between hermeneutical strategies, identifying their specificity and detecting difficulties they have.
The explicit hermeneutic of time
One of the most famous difficulties
which is associated with time, is
the harmonization of intuitive and discursive intelligibility.
On
the one hand, time is one of the evidences of consciousness, which, at first glance, does not require a reflexive theming and meticulous research,
but on the other hand, time
demonstrates the inpermeability
of its impenetrability
evidence, resisting any descriptive study and
the substantial of representation.
Non-obvious evidence of time makes itself felt through a meaning shortage – one of the main prerequisite of discursive cognition. Any cognition means a transition from ignorance to knowledge. The result of this process
is the creation of the concept and
the process of compensation of meaning shortage is considered in the
theory of knowledge as a process
of conceptualization. The appearence of the concept is the token of the
transition from vagueness and ambiguity of the original intuitions to the
clarity and distinctness of final presentation. However,
the variety of existing concepts of time
cannot talk about self-identity of process of compensate of meaning shortage. Under this
section will be considered an
explicit strategy of
conceptualizing of time.
The Explication of
implicit involves the formation of a particular mode of representation, which
at first opens access to time for our thought.
In
other words, the result of the meaning shortage
compensation process is the appearance of the notion
(idea) of time, which is expressed in
explicit form by using different
formulations and distinctions.
In this case, explicit can be not only the hermeneutical strategies of conceptualization of time. Our immediate task now becomes to identify
the specific of explicit hermeneutic conceptualization of time in comparison with the vulgar concept of time of traditional
metaphysics and to estimate its
heuristics.
One
of the most important characteristics
of hermeneutics in general and the hermeneutic conceptualization
of time in particular,
is the circular nature of understanding, which suggests that understanding can not be regarded as an existing off-line conscious act of fixing
the transition from ignorance to
knowledge. First, the understanding
does not start from scratch, and always implies a certain pre/before-understanding (prefiguration),
which, in turn, can be adjusted in the
light of what have been understood. Second, since
hermeneutics works first of all with texts, insofar understanding (configuration)
is impossible without reading (refiguration),
acting simultaneously as a source of
modification of pre-understanding
(prefiguration).
Prefiguration,
configuration and refiguration form a
circular unity (the
hermeneutic circle), in which a movement of understanding exists. The hermeneutic
circle has no beginning and no
end, so the researcher has to focus not on
breaking (opening), but rather on the correct entering
in this cycle.
On what kind of penetration strategy researcher chooses
will depend the motion of subsequent
conceptualization.
The
first variant of entering in the
hermeneutic circle is a philosophical concept by Martin Heidegger.
According
to the German philosopher, to create a full sense of time is necessary to focus on the conceptual development of our pre-understanding, prefiguration of time. It is pre-understanding
that eliminates hopelessness
of human thought about the time, supplying it with a guiding light to exit from the endless jungle of doubt and speculation.
Heidegger points out that it is
impossible to start looking for something
about which we have no idea.
Moreover, pre-understanding plays a crucial role not only in the configuration
of the concept of time, but also in the process of its (concept) refiguration.
In the absence of such pre-understanding would become impossible any theming of time.
As
a second variant of
entering in the hermeneutic circle can be considered the concept of the French thinker - Paul
Ricoeur.
The
subject of analysis here is the correlation between the configuration
of time of text with the prefiguration
of practical field and with the refiguration in perception of the
product. In view of Ricoeur, each configuration has invariant temporal structures,
which make conditions for understanding both
of historical and fictional narrative. Such
comparative hermeneutics will make our understanding
of time richer, and therefore, it is the configuration of time requires urgent attention in the
process of compensation of meanings shortage.
Finally, the last variant of entering in the
hermeneutic circle is the project of another
German thinker - Hans-Georg
Gadamer.
Unlike
Heidegger, Gadamer is not inclined to
give absolute priority in the conceptualization of time to prefiguration, because there is no single right criterion pre-understanding. Activitie-historical hermeneutics,
which has been founded by Gadamer, has as its main premise refiguration.
In the process of reading, one way or another, a certain image of time has been pronouncing. The explication of this image
outside of refiguration is impossible. According to Gadamer, the hermeneutic conceptualization of time will be a permanent way
of clarification of time,
based on the refiguration of different meanings endless sea of texts.
The
decisive factor in
the process of hermeneutical
conceptualization of time recives a way of
penetration into the hermeneutic circle.
Depending
on what the bet will be (on the prefiguration,
or on the configuration, or on the
refiguration of time), we get one
or another concept of time. Thus,
the explicit hermeneutics of time
does not resemble
of any previous strategies of
conceptualization of time, but
talk about the absolute opposition would be premature. Actually
the difference between them lies only in technique but
not in the grounds. The understanding of conceptualization as the compensation of meaning shortage, in
explicit strategy, clashes with the
problem of referent of the meaning reality. In other words, the process of conceptualization is changed into a kind of intellectual game,
in which we devote our time not for searching the truth,
but to harmonizing of many parts of the
concept. Some meanings
are always explained with other
meanings. The process of compensation of
meaning shortage is never finished,
because there is no recent references. Thus, the conceptualization
of time is transformed into pseudo-conceptualization, because one evidence
will be always sent to another and so on to infinity. This "marking time" does not imply an
increment of knowledge: either we
stay with a pre-prepared and dogmatically
accepted notion of time, or lose his footing,
replacing reality with meaning.
The implicit hermeneutic of time
If explicit hermeneutical conceptualization of
time implied that the idea of time is
a certain set of meanings,
which appears as a result of
discursive research,
the implicit hermeneutical conceptualization of
time focused on the temporality of meanings itself, and tried to
look into the space that precedes all meaning. Thus,
the implicit hermeneutic of time does
not mean the construction of a clear
definition of time and thus gets
rid of the difficulties associated with further verification, making shortcomings of
previous strategies in its conceptual qualities. Understanding and comprehension of
time, according to the implicit hermeneutics, has
nothing to do with the extensive increment of meanings. The answer
of the question about time has to
look at the process of beginnings of meanings, in the
"intensity"
of the original and clear experience of
time. The main task is to fix this experience.
Implicit and explicit hermeneutic of
time - two sides of same coin. The indissolubility of their connection suggests that one
without the other is impossible and unnecessary. In
this case, to clarify the specifics of the
implicit hermeneutical strategy of conceptualization of
time we need to concentrate on how by
means of prefiguration, configuration and refiguration
of time we come into contact with temporality of prefiguration, configuration and refiguration.
So
the reflective
research of prefiguration has
nothing to do with the explication of some pre-determined
meanings. The main presupposition here is time
itself, which on the one hand, exists before any
consciousness and any world (it is time which, according
to Heidegger, is more subjective then any subject and is more objective then any object), and, on the other hand, is able to
open our access to consciousness and world
(any consciousness is a temporal
consciousness, and any world is a temporal world). By concentrating on the elaboration
of pre-understanding, we do not research our
idea of time, but the way in which time implicitly asserting
about itself in the implementation of this act.
According
to Heidegger, the authentic experience of time is
the experience of event. Resisting not only the
subject of representation, but also the
traditional metaphysicians procedure meaning of
alienation (as compensation for the conceptualization of
the meaning), The event points out the necessity of going out of frameworks
of the traditional metaphysical systems of thought, by
means of resisting not only the subject representation but also the traditional metaphysical procedure
of alienation of meaning (conceptualization as compensation of
the meanings shortage). This
process of "conceptual destruction," gives
us a new way of thinking which not
only requires the construction of
some definitions, but, strictly speaking, can
not be viewed as a process of conceptualization. The question is: if it is possible to touch
to the true time or to a true being, whether in this
case, the concept has place? Could
such a reflection of
time become an surplus process,
in which the concept appears
only in order to begin the process of
its own destruction,
conceptualization?
The temporality of configuration become
apparent in narrativity. But here also there is no explication of
some image of time. Rather, if the configuration itself would not be temporary, the story in
general would not take place. The configuration does not allow the
events of the story to appear at
the same time. Delaying some
events and bringing closer others, the configuration for the first time creates a time sequence. But
the temporality of configuration itself can not be
understood within the framework of the
scheme. The excess of meanings as the
cause of the configuration, however, can
not explain the idea of a sequence
and justify the analytic distinction between the time the
narrative. Trying to coordinate time of
narrative and narrated time,
Ricoeur, in the end, clashes
with the Heidegger's difficulty of fixation
of direct experience of time.
Finally,
as the last implicit hermeneutical conceptualization of
time can be considered the interpretation of
temporality of refiguration. It also is not based on reading some image of
time or some meaning of time. Ass opposed to configuration,
which is satiated
wiht meanings, refiguration experience a constant
shortage of them. The
reason for this lack may not be some
other meaning, the transcendental signified, which would once detected. Thus,
trying to think the matter of resumption of the refiguration or the
specific time, we have to abandon the construction of a concept.
The
main obstacle to an implicit hermeneutical conceptualization of
time is language that determine the
impossibility of fixing nonpredicative (existential) experience of time. Eliminating linguistic intersubjectivity leads
to a relativization of the experience, because it makes impossible creation a typology of the perceived and, accordingly, its subsequent identification.
Because
different languages provide
us with opportunities for understanding and comprehension of
time in different ways, and such an understanding and comprehension
outside the language is impossible, so far every concept of
time, which pretend to universality, is untenable. Understanding
of time is a necessary adjunct of linguistic
competence, to the extent that the language includes an
immanent temporality (grammatical system
of the time,
or different lexical items that
represent or characterize the time), which is assimilated by when we integrate into a system of
communicative interactions.
Bibliography
1. Gadamer H.-G. Truth and Method.
2nd rev. edition. Trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad,
2004.
2. Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit, in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe,
volume 2, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann, 1977.
3. Ricoeur P. Time and narerative. Vol. 1-3. The University of
Chicago Press. 1990.