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PhD in
Political Science Polyakov E.M.
Voronezh State University, Russia
Failed States, Warlords and
non-legitimate Violence.
In the modern
world has sharply increased the frequency of illegitimate violence, especially
among the youth. Speaking about the causes of violence, Henrik Urdal emphasizes
that in the event of large cohorts of young people are "stretching"
of social institutions (e.g. labor market), which entails the strengthening of
social dissatisfaction. It is this dissatisfaction with social freedom (i.e.,
lack of family and responsibility for anyone), and brings to life the youth
violence [1, 5]. In another work he describes (in the form of hypotheses), the
conditions under which there is a politically motivated violence. These include
the presence of “youth bulge”, the political dependency, low economic growth,
rapid expansion of higher education, the authoritarian nature of the regime and
the level of urbanization. The higher each of these indicators, the greater
will be the violence [2, 611-615].
It is easy to
see that these conditions were typical for countries emerging “Arab spring”.
These same countries (like Russia) maintained a policy of “catch-up
modernization”. An important circumstance faced by all countries engaged in
modernization - migration. First of all, it is labor migration within the
country from small towns to cities - centers of industrialization and
modernization. Cities depersonalize contacts of people in mass, and so create the
necessary condition for the transition to open access orders. But more
importantly, they are a mechanism for adsorbing the excess rural population,
especially in high natural growth. Studies Helen Ware on the material of
Oceania have shown that in countries with low urbanization (Solomon Islands,
Papua - New Guinea) and strong emigration instability and violence occur more
frequently than in countries with a share of the urban population of more than
40% and a strong internal migration from rural to of [3, 3-7]. However, we must
not forget that although the city offers more features and provides a higher
standard of living, this level does not increase gradually but dramatically
changed, and once when you move. In combination with the lack of self (i.e., transition
opportunities into reality in the form of quality education, career, etc.), the
city can turn into a kind of social drives of aggression and splash it in the
most unpredictable time in the form of uncontrolled violence.
It is
interesting to note that in transitional societies illegitimate violence often
takes the form of terrorism, and in a sense, like the violence of primitive
tribes. As shown above considered the works of anthropologists, in archaic
societies, violence is often a ritual or has a symbolic nature. The true object
of violent acts is not the one to whom they are directed. Most often, it serves
society. For example, if the need to isolate one of the members of the tribe of
relatives, he is killed or banished. Here the object (i.e., those for whom the
action is directed and from whom they expect a certain effective reactions) is
more public than the one of isolated individual.
A similar situation is observed in the implementation of the attacks. The
object is to impact society, or part thereof (e.g., administrative and
managerial staff), though the violence is directly facing either the military
or innocent civilians. In a broad sense, terrorism is the unlawful use of force
or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coercion of the
government, the civilian population or their components in political or social
objectives [4, 72].
That is,
terrorism is organically linked with the pressure on the government, based on a
physical threat. The main reason for “the success of violence” of terrorists
may be a social collapse, more precisely, its consequences - is not accidental
splash of terrorist activity we see in so-called “failed states”, which are in
the process of decay and disintegration. Carl Butzer in his work shows that the
collapse of complex societies is under the influence of several factors of
which are limiting the economic downturn, the lack of critical resources, time
frames, as well as political and cultural flexibility [5, 3632-3639]. However,
only the last two factors are crucial, and the previous are only responsible
for the scale of the collapse, but not for the fact of its occurrence. “Failed
states” have the following characteristics:
- Availability of civil wars or
foreign invasions;
- Ethnic, religious or linguistic
strife;
- The state does not fully
control its territory and borders;
- Weak central institutions,
dependent courts and the lack of democracy;
- The collapse of infrastructure
and corruption;
- A sharp increase in the income
gap between rich and poor;
- Finally, the use of military
force the executive branch [6, 3].
In this
regard, one should especially consider the situation in Russia. It is a unique
phenomenon: the state of the developed world in transition, and social system
in which the demand for violence. Monitoring data from the World Fund for the
past few years (2006-2011), which is calculated based on the Failed States
Index said that the main difficulties in collapsed states cause the presence of
refugees and displaced persons, the disunity of the elites, the low legitimacy
of the state and ineffective intelligence apparatus [See: 7]. At the very
least, these figures relate to the control of violence. And they troubled
countries (Somalia, Afghanistan, Chad, Sudan, etc., occupying first place in
the annual rankings of the Fund) is most often equal to 10.0 (maximum
theoretically possible on a scale from 0.0 to 10.0) or slightly deviate from it
(no more than 0.5 points). Note that other criteria are rarely more than 8.0
points.
To explain
this strange is capable concept of warlords. They are the rulers whose control
a certain area is based on military power. The territory controlled by warlord,
usually coincides with the boundaries of the settlement group from which it
takes place (ethnic, social, professional, religious). He enjoys certain
legitimacy and replaces or subjugates the functions, institutions and resources
of the state. In this economy often is mixed and reduced to one or another
illegal activity, although not confined within this area [8, 9]. The key point
is the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence: although Warlord replaces the
state, his power and violence do not become illegitimate, as is the case with
terrorist organizations. On the contrary, reliance on fear and physical violence
can create and maintain a semblance of order (based on power rather than on the
right), and the personal nature of the power elite united on the basis of shaky
consensus. The ruling group is afraid of changes in leadership since the
emergence of a new warlord inevitably means a redistribution of wealth,
influence and power.
On the
material of the study of Rwanda, Iraq and Kosovo, Rada, Peter came to the
conclusion that to change this regime requires the following conditions:
security, democratic institutions, stability and nation-building, economic
development [6, 7-11]. Accordingly, such a regime has a certain stability and
internal stability, whose shortcomings, however, are too large - they can not
be transferred to a larger area or group and are based solely on the violence
or the threat of its use.
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