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Òóãàí-Áàðàíîâñêîãî,
Óêðàèíà
Political Aspects of European Integration.
The European Union has been the
most advanced and successful alliances of the independent countries in the
modern history. One cannot deny that it is only the EU which established – at
least in the first pillar – a new legal order for its Member States, by which
they voluntarily shared their sovereignty based on the rule of law in order to
achieve the common task, as set forth by Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community: “...to promote throughout the Community a harmonious
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social
protection, the raising of a standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.” The EU is
unique to have the European Court of Justice which, unlike any other
international tribunals, has a compulsory jurisdiction and an exclusive
authority to interpret the Community legislation – at least, with respect to
the first pillar of the EU. By widely interpreting the EC legislation and
relying not just on the text, but also on ‘the spirit of the Treaty, the
European Court of Justice has actually developed its own doctrine which is now
seen as one of the important sources of the Community law. This doctrine has
played a crucial role in implementing EU policies, since the text of the Treaty
and other Community legislation cannot cover in detail all aspects of
integration.
But why integrate? What made
European governments act against their cautious political interests? The answer
was given by Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European
Communities and a lover of aphorisms: “People only accept changes when faced
with necessity, and only recognise necessity when the crisis is upon them.” I
couldn’t agree more with the first part of Monnet’s saying, but I would like to
replace the word ‘only’ with the word “better” in its second part. A deep
crisis is probably the most powerful impetus to bring peoples and countries
together, although not the only one. This is exactly what happened immediately
after the World War II. The need for fundamental political and economic
change in Europe was extremely strong. As the Cold War commenced and the Iron
Curtain abruptly divided the continent, integration became a means by which the
Western Europe could defend itself, in close co-operation with the United
States, against the external Soviet threat and the internal communist threat.
The need for a stronger and united Europe outweighed an initial desire of the
Allies to pasteurise Germany.
Naturally, in some areas
governments tend to reach agreements more easily. “The least disputed goal of
European Construction is the large market without borders; even those Member
States with reservations over other objectives do not dispute this one”. This
explains why the first pillar of the EU – economic integration – has virtually
reached supranational level. Community member states are willing to share their
sovereignty in this field because it is clearly in their interest to do so. The
European Single Market has become the world’s largest domestic market. It has
contributed significantly to the economic growth, though its full potential has
not yet been realised. But ...the political will is evident. By contrast, quite
little has been achieved since Maastricht in the two other pillars of the EU –
Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
which still remain intergovernmental. By common agreement, CFSP was one of the
major disappointments of Maastricht. After all, Maastricht proposed not only a
common foreign and security policy, but declared the eventual aim to be a
common defence. This has inevitably leaded to the relationship between the EU
and the defence alliance, the Western European Union (WEU), being put at stake.
Similarly, JHA pillar which
includes issues of combating international crime and fraud, and issues related
to a common approach to immigration policy is a hard nut to crack for the EU
because of the national sensitivity to these. However, there has been some
progress in this respect in Maastricht and further in Amsterdam – at least the
workable mechanism was set out. Besides, it is a very fertile area of
co-operation between the EU and the US.
The EU as a scapegoat is hardly a
new concept; the problem lies in the fact that the EU has moved into an
ever-wider range of policy areas, including, with Maastricht, areas previously
very closely identified with the prerogative of the nation state. The
traditional concept of legitimacy cannot be fully applied to the institutions
of the EU simply because a “single European nation”, or European demos in its
traditional sense does not exist as such and is not likely to appear within
foreseeable future. A parliament is a traditionally democratic institution not
because “it provides a mechanism for representation and majority voting, but
because it represents ... the nation, the demos from which it derive its
authority and legitimacy of its decisions”. If we follow the logic of this no-demos
clause, the European Parliament cannot be legitimate and democratic by
definition, and, therefore, the increase of powers of the EP at the expense of
the Council (the voice of the Member States) is a step in the wrong direction.
I cannot agree to this. The demos is traditionally seen though the
ethno-cultural prism. Can’t we imagine a “polity whose demos is defined,
accepted and understood in civic, non-ethno-cultural terms, and would have
legitimate rule-making democratic authority and that basis?” Can’t we separate
nationality from citizenship? Can’t people unite on the basis of shared values,
a shared understanding of rights and duties, and shared rational, intellectual
culture which transcend ethno-national differences? This appears to be the
concept of introducing EU citizenship. According to this viewpoint (which is I
personally share, too), the directly elected European Parliament is a
democratic and legitimate institution for EU citizens, and therefore its powers
must be increased. But the problem lies in misunderstanding. During the Danish
referendum for the ratification of Maastricht, some Danes feared that when
acquiring EU citizenship they were losing their national citizenship. Indeed, “...there
was a failure to put across the idea that citizenship of the Union is not
intended to replace the national citizenship but actually to complement it”. In
some cases the perception was the opposite. Thus, the European Union should be
brought closer to its citizens who will allow the disputes on legitimacy to be
resolved in future. To do this, the following issues must be addressed.
Over twenty separate complex
systems are now used to adopt legislation in the EU, and there is a lack of
logic in the choice of the various procedures. Although willing to share
sovereignty, governments retain as much political control as possible.
Simplification is, therefore, considered necessary and the pressure is growing
to reduce these procedures to three. The tendency is to move from unanimity to
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and to extending
co-decision powers of the European Parliament which, in turn, will increase the
legitimacy of the latter. Maintaining unanimity requirement could, indeed,
paralyse a larger Union and prevent future Treaty reform.
Should Member States willing to do
so be specifically allowed to integrate their policies further and faster than
their more reluctant EU partners? Yes, otherwise the Union should be forever
bound to advance at the speed of its slowest members. To some extent,
flexibility already exists. Social policy, a single currency arrangement and
the Scheme acquits all involve fewer than all fifteen Member States. Moreover,
unbalanced economic integration of the EU has been beneficial to its Member
States. As long as there is agreement on the goal, we can have flexibility. If
there is no common goal we get variable geometry which is widely seen as more
dangerous.
Relatively small issues may
suddenly become big issues in practice. The EU Council of Ministers of 12 June
1995 has not only reaffirmed its firm attachment to Linguistic Diversity, it
has also decided to set up a commission to check that all the Institutions
respect this... The Commission has been invited to make yearly reports on the
application of these decisions. The current number of working languages of the
EU is eleven. Since EU legislation is directly applicable in the national law,
all languages with the official status in one or more of the Member States
should be official EU languages as well. This means that there are now eleven
official EU languages. With some Eastern Bloc countries joining the number will
increase to sixteen or more which, in my opinion, will be virtually unworkable.
This will only contribute to the lack of efficiency of the EU. I think it is
wise to limit the number of working languages to a minimum of five, although in
view of the fact that Council members have never been able to agree on a limit
the number of working languages within the institutions, one may expect a continuing
debate on this matter.
As we see, the EU is far from
being perfect. And it never will, like any other man-made enterprise. The EU
must upgrade its capacity to respond favourably to the other counties in
Europe, otherwise we may find ourselves once again in a divided Europe.
Therefore, my suggestion is that the limits of integration of the EU are
politically unaffordable, in other words, ‘the locomotive of European
Integration’ has passed the point of no return and there is no way back.