Titarenko I.N.

The Stoic Conception of a Language and Problems of Modern Linguistics and Cognitive Anthropology

Learning a language represents a field of interdisciplinary investigations, where philosophers, linguists, logicians, psychologists, cultural researchers and other scientists put their effort. This is not unexpected since a researcher who turns to investigating a natural language would be unable to avoid dealing with such questions as the relationship between a language, thought and reality, uncovering the human cognition mechanisms, cross-cultural communication, influence of a language upon the peculiarity of the way every ethnic group perceives the reality, etc. Analyzing a language as a means of communication that is a sign system, which allows us to pick out and identify objects of the environment, to generalize their features and formulate some abstract ideas provides us with a deep insight into the human nature. A man, being a part of the society, and being endowed with reason expresses his individuality as well as thought processes through language forms. As the result of this fact, the present-day branches of science dealing with linguistics (such as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and others) tend to follow the anthropological paradigm, which calls for synthesizing the proper vocabulary system analysis and philosophical knowledge about a man as a conscious social and cultural being. On the other hand, philosophical anthropology claims a thorough analysis of a language, its structure and its functions.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out, that it was quite a long time ago that the thinkers came to the necessity of a language in-depth analysis. As an example, we can refer to the linguistic philosophy of the Stoics. The ideas of its representatives, namely Zeno, Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon are traditionally studied not only in the course of history of philosophy but also in the history of linguistics course as they created an integrated system of knowledge about a language, regarding the latter as a display of reason. At the same time the Stoics doctrine was based upon the linguistic information, and primarily on semantic syntax

All the linguistic ideas were traditionally stated within their logic theory. Logic was an essential part of their doctrine directly linked with physics and ethic [Diogenes Laertius, 7, 40]. It was to fulfill the functions of general propaedeutics and epistemology and the whole Stoic Orthodox doctrine was as a rule preceded and guided by logic. Unfortunately, time has damaged greatly the logic part of the stoics' doctrine. Their logic terminology is fairly difficult and due to the fact that the early stoics' works have been lost and the later Stoics were not so interested in logic, so we can judge on their ideas of logic only relying upon some second-hand sources which are often but fragmentary. However, the logic part of the Stoic philosophy has been reconstructed [1], fairly well, which enables us to study and to analyze the remaining ideas of the stoics about language.

The Stoics' logic was divided into two main clusters – rhetoric as an art of persuasion and dialectics, which included grammar (the theory of the signifier) and formal logic (as the theory of the signified). Their study on the criterion of cognition and on ways of definitions classifications are sometimes stated as separate theories.

According to the Stoics, world cognition starts with sense perception, and its information coming through senses that become the primordial material for thought. Before any sense experience, «the man's soul is a blank slate, ready for inscriptions» [2]. From the information supplied by perception through pneuma to the supervising centre, an impression in the soul is formed (phantasia) [SVF I, 58]. At the same time, the Stoics are convinced that a man's senses do not deceive him, so they cannot be estimated as true or false. The factor of truth or error can be applied only to a statement, which needs to be agreed with, the agreement being a preliminary estimate of the statement meaning, (but not the impression itself). Agreement represents the ability of analyzing and estimating the statement about the impressions. As a result of this analysis a conception (кatalepsis) should be created, that is coming to understanding of the material nature of an object.

The question of the perception criterion (the origin of knowledge criterion) [3], is rather complicated and its decision is linked to a number of problems, since the early Stoics were unable to find a definite answer to the question whether perception, experience or the so-called «cataleptic impression» (the immediate discretion) should be accepted as the perception criterion. However that may be, the sequences of the uniform impressions coming to a person form experience, which leads to creating conceptions, retaining the general hallmarks of the sequences [Seneca. Ep., 120, 4-5]. So, when describing the process of creating general conceptions the Stoics tend to be nominalists.

The most important subject that attracted particular interest within the dialectics as the crucial part of the Stoic logic was the relationship between the signifier and the signified, that is «the theory of signs». The early Stoic emphasized the correlation between the sign itself (the signifier – to sēmainon) the meaning (the signified – to lecton) and the object (to tygchanon). The sign and the object were considered corporeal while the meaning was incorporeal. Thus, the Stoic based their dialectics on the ideas of the sign nature of knowledge, that is they considered it necessary to distinguish within the act of speech the signifier or the pronounced sound and the signified or the meaning of what is pronounced as a link between a thought and a sound.

These ideas prove that the Stoic were the first to propose the notion of the sign of a language and thus to initiate the semiotic theory of language.

The early Stoic ideas on relation between a sign, meaning and an object can be found in the works of the late stoicism representative and a Roman philosopher Seneca: «There are bodies of different origin: for example this is a man and this is a horse. These are immediately followed by the soul's excitation which announces a body (has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum). These soul excitations represent something independent, not connected with the bodies. (hi habent proprium quiddam et a corporibus seductumi). I see Cato walking. My perception showed me this (hoc sensus ostendit), and my soul believed it (animus credidit). What I see is a body (сorpus est quod video), which I examined with my eyes and my reason. (cui et oculos intendi et animum). And so I say: "Cato is walking"» [Seneca. Ep., 117, 13]. There is an object of cognition – some situation or phenomenon of the world. As a result of its impact upon our organs of perception, for example an eye as in the stated case, we get some idea or image, which is later conceived in or soul (namely in our mind) and thus we get the ideal meaning or the contents of knowledge which eventually grows into a judgment. The meaning of the utterance is incorporeal. «What I am saying now is not in the least a body, but it is something that announces a body (non corpus, inquit, est, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore)» [Seneca. Ep., 117, 13]. As it can be clearly seen here in treating this question Seneca follows the dogma of his doctrine and makes almost no alterations in Stoic ideas of incorporeal meaning, identified by the ancient Greeks as to lecton [4]. He finds difficulty in rendering this term into Latin: «Some call it “outspoken” (effatum), others think a term “announced” (enuntiatum), is more suitable, and others call it “said” (edictum)» [Seneca. Ep., 117, 13].

The difference between the meaning and the sound is transmitted by is regarded by the Stoic as the difference between the endophasia or internalspeech (logos endiathetos) and the external or the pronounced (logos prophoricos) speech. Endophasia is a set of meanings that is what we think of while pronouncing the corresponding words. Only human beings are endowed with endophasia (logos endiathetos), though animals are also able to make sounds. Therefore, the language analysis leads the Stoics to the problem of human nature and its peculiarities compared to the nature of other living things. A sentient being is capable of passing the contents of their conscience to other sentient beings by means of words. Children (who are, according to the Stoics, devoid of reason) and animals do not know the meanings and the correct words links, so they can only appeal to the external form of speech, which is non-meaningful [Varr. De l. lat. VI, 56.].

The correct implication on the meaning level (lekton) is a subjective guarantee of the Universe being understood and includes fixing the causality [Sext. Adv. M. VIII, 275-276]. The laws of language and thought do not determine the forms of the Universe, but according to the Stoics, reveal the objective contents of the cosmos. The human reason is a mere reflection of the Universal reason (logos) – the only true guarantee of the objectivity and the integrity of the Universe. For a Stoic philosopher nothing but truly cognized logic enables him to make true conclusions concerning the world’s organizations and people’s behavior: the order of and the interrelations between the meanings must be the same as the order of and the interrelations between the «denotat». Strange as it might seem to be, the problem of the correlation between the sign and the signified object, which the ancient Greeks considered, still remains within the scope of interests of contemporary logic, linguistics and semantics. It is particularly interesting when applied to the analysis of the expressions used to indicate, to name and to identify objects and concepts, which are in between the thought and the world. The question is whether these expressions indicate the object by means of a concept (Frege) or in a more direct way (Kaplan, Kripke, Putnam).

The Stoic philosophy also treats the problem of cross-cultural communication which is one of the major themes right up today for the representatives of the cognitive anthropology. The incorporeal signified or the pure meanings are the things, which are incomprehensible for the barbarians, as they hear the Greek speech [Diogenes Laertius, VII, 55; Sext. Adv. M., VII, 38]. The fact that the same meaning can be expressed with different words equals to the difference in languages. Being sure of the entirety of the world guided by the Universal reason, of the human conscious commonality and of the common logic world structure the Stoic philosophers suggested the commonality of meanings, expressed through different word combinations. At the same time, this theme was particularly appealing when referring to the cosmopolitanism, proclaimed by the Stoics. Contemporary cognitive anthropology and psycholinguistics have refused these conclusions, which are too categorical. Today’s knowledge about the relationship between the language, the culture and the thought give rise to the idea that the ethnic differences in the uttered speech and in the sounding of what we pronounce are determined by cultural differences in the environment perception and estimation, hence in the meanings of what is said (to lecton).

Nevertheless, the Stoic philosophy analysis makes an impressive case in favor of the fact that various problems, touched upon by the Hellenic thinkers, have been returned to and developed by the world’s philosophers of different times. And though not all ideas were directly adopted, the range of problems discussed by the Stoic philosophers within the language theory retain their importance for contemporary science, which considers a language as an object to interdisciplinary research.

Literature

1. Mates B. Stoic Logic. Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1953; Barwick K. Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik. B., 1957; Bobzien S. Die Stoische Modallogik. Würzburg, 1986; Egli U. Zur Stoischen Dialektik. Basel, 1967; Frede M. Die Stoische Logik. Göttingen, 1974 etc.

2. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (SVF). Coll. I. ab Arnim. Vol. I-III. Lipsiae, 1903-1905; Vol. IV. Indices, conscr. M. Adler. Lipsiae, 1924; Vol. I-IV. Leiden, 1964. – Vol. II, 83.

3. More in detail see: Stoliarov A.A. Stoia and Stoicism. Moscow: «Kami Group», 1998, p. 48-68.

4. SVF II, 168; Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 8, 11-12. The ancient Stoic theory of lecta is too complex and many-sided, so it can’t be under consideration in this work. For further details see: Losev A.F. The History of Ancient Aesthetics. The early Hellenic period. Moscow, 1979, p. 87-91; Mates B. Stoic Logic. Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1953; Mau J. Stoische Logik// Hermes. 85. 1957; Frege M. Die stoische Logik. Göttingen, 1974.