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Ann Kosenko
Yuri Fedkovych Chernivtsi National
University
Evidentiality and epistemic modality
Evidentiality is a deictic category, not a modal one. The
basic meaning is to mark the relation between the speaker and the action she/he
is describing. Evidentiality thus fulfills the same function for marking
relationships between speakers and actions/events that, say, demonstratives do
for marking relationships between speakers and objects. Evidentiality is not a
priori concerned with the modal aspects of the proposition although it must be stressed
that (epistemic) modality may enter the picture at some point. Anyone listening
to linguistic information containing evidentials is free to interpret that
information however they wish but that does not make modality part of the basic
meaning of evidentiality. Rather the situation is similar to the past tense in
English, which can have modal interpretations but that
does not mean that modality is part of the basic meaning of the Past tense in
English.
Evidentiality is traditionally divided in
two main categories: direct evidentiality, which shows that the speaker has directly witnessed
the action, and indirect evidentiality, which shows that the speaker has no direct evidence for
his/her statement, but has other sources for making the statement. Typical
direct evidential categories are visual and auditory evidence, stating that the speaker has respectively
seen and heard the action.
Indirect evidentials can be inferentials, which mean that the speaker has inferred the action
from available evidence, and quotatives (also referred to in the literature as reportative or
hearsay evidentiality), which states that the speaker knows about the event from
being told by another person. It is not unusual to think of these two
categories as representing different degrees of commitment to the truth of the
action: indirect evidentials show that the speaker is not as committed to the
truth of what she/he is saying than when a direct evidential is used. This view
may be correct in some cases, but this is not the reason why evidentials are
employed. They are used to denote the relative distance between the speaker and
the action. A speaker will use an indirect evidential to state that the action
takes/took place outside the speaker’s deictic sphere, whereas the use of a
direct evidential shows that the action takes or took place within that deictic
sphere.
The relationship between epistemic modality
and evidentiality seems obvious, especially when looked at from the perspective
of English. A typical view is Palmer who divides epistemic modality into
judgments, speculation about the action described, and evidentials, assessment
based on some type of evidence. From that perspective it is indeed not hard to
conclude that there is a link between the two categories. In English must,
for instance, both interpretations appear to be present, since strong epistemic
must
is indeed used
to make an assessment that an action took place based on some type of evidence.
A more limited approach is taken by Van der Auwera and Plungian who only admit inferentiality as a
modal category, but not the others.
De Haan argues that there is no good reason
to consider evidentiality a part of epistemic modality or even to consider them
to be interchangeable terms. Evidentiality asserts the evidence, while epistemic modality evaluates the evidence.
Anderson and Keenan in their article on
deictic marking following standard usage, consider as deictic expressions (or deictics for short) those linguistic elements whose interpretation
in simple sentences makes essential reference to properties of the extralinguistic
context of the utterance in which they occur. Although Anderson and Keenan do
not discuss evidentiality, this definition covers evidential usage very well. Their
usage makes crucial reference to the extralinguistic context. For instance, an auditory
evidential can only be used in those situations in which the speaker has heard
the action or event he/she is describing. This also implies that that action or
event is capable of making sounds. Each individual evidential category has
similar extralinguistic roperties. As with deictic expressions like
demonstratives, evidentials have as deictic center the speaker of the
utterance. The speaker and its grammatical correlate first person singular,
therefore has special properties in evidential systems.
As the presumed deictic center of
evidentiality, first person singular occupies a special position in evidential
paradigms. There is an apparent incompatibility between indirect evidentiality
and first person subjects. The reason is of course that it is very hard to have
only indirect evidence for actions in which the speaker himself was the main
participant.
Bibliography:
1.
Anderson,
Stephen R.; Edward L. Keenan. 1985. “Deixis”. In: Timothy Shopen (ed.), language typology and
Syntactic description Vol. III, Grammatical categories and the lexicon,
259-308. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2.
De Haan, Ferdinand.
1999. “Evidentiality and
Epistemic Modality: Setting Boundaries”. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18.
3.
Palmer,
Frank R. 2001. Mood and Modality, second edition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press.
4.
Van
der Auwera, Johan; Vladimir Plungian. 1998. “Modality’s semantic map”. Linguistic Typology 2, 79-124.